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Ten Years of EU Membership – The 
Maltese Parliament 
 
by Mark Harwood 
Introduction 
The European Union has long seen the use of enlargement as a means to transform its neighbours. 
For many of the 2004 enlargement countries, membership was a means to open economically and 
politically. For Malta and Cyprus, established democracies with extensive trade links across Europe, 
EU membership still had the capacity to transform their political and economic systems and hence 
the need, a decade on, to take stock. With this in mind and conscious that the EU political system 
has often raised concerns over legitimacy and accountability, attention is increasingly being focused 
on how the complexities of the EU political system, and the role national governments play in that 
system, impacts the legitimacy and accountability of the domestic political system, in particular the 
functioning of the national parliament. To this end, this paper will analyse how the Maltese 
Parliament has been impacted by membership and seek to establish whether there has been a 
significant alteration in its ability to hold the national executive to account.  
The Europeanization of National Parliaments 
While the impact of the EU on domestic political structures and processes (taken to be 
Europeanization) has grown as an area of research since the 1990s, it is only in the last decade that 
we see a systematic analysis of how national parliaments (NPs) have been affected by the growing 
competence and political complexity of the EU’s political system.1 This reflects the fact that NPs 
were often slow to engage with EU affairs and therefore less likely to be directly impacted by 
Europeanisation while the highly differentiated outcomes seen across NPs made generalisations 
about the influence of the Union difficult.  
In fact, the literature is not conclusive as to whether NPs come under Europeanisation, even though 
the early literature was clear that NPs were a principal loser from EU integration.2 In this regard, the 
increased competence assigned to the EU and its political structures emboldened national 
executives to the detriment of their national legislatures. However, this did not automatically 
challenge the work of NPs; ‘if the traditional functions of the parliaments can be listed as 
representation, deliberations, legislation, authorization of expenditure, and scrutiny of the 
executive, the formal increase in power and influence of the EU does not directly impact any of 
these except scrutiny of the executive’.3 The result for NPs is that they lose manoeuvrability within 
the domestic political system but this does not automatically cause change in their role or structure, 
                                                          
1
 Maurer, A and Wessels, W (eds.) (2001), National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe. Losers or 
Latecomers?, Germany: Nomos. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ladrech, R. (2010), Europeanization and National Politics, UK: Palgrave, p. 80. 
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nor in the way they do business, something one would expect with Europeanisation. Indeed, some 
argue that the shift in the executive-legislative relationship merely reflects a process of de-
parliamentarisation which is being seen across Europe and which is not specific to EU membership.4 
So while it could be argued that the NPs’ loss of power relative to the national executive might 
reflect shifts in decision-making subsequent to EU membership (where no single state can control 
outcomes within the EU, which therefore, complicates the ability of NPs to hold the executive to 
account in policy areas decided in Brussels), it can also reflect wider shifts in European politics with 
the tendency for coalition governments to last longer, the presidentialisation of executives as well as 
the enhanced role and organisation of public bureaucracies, which all lead to the executive-
legislative dynamic tilting in favour of the former.5  
While we can question whether NPs come under Europeanisation, the fact that they reacted to the 
burgeoning power of the EU in a similar manner implies some link to EU membership, with Norton 
distinguishing three stages of adaptation: the first stage covered the period before the 1980s when 
NPs did not engage with EU affairs but appeared comfortable with giving the executive free reign to 
conduct business in Brussels, primarily because the general public was not engaged in EU politics 
and EU affairs were considered technical and of minor interest to MPs.6 This was followed in the 
1980s and 1990s with a second phase when, in reaction to the Single European Act and the 
federalist push surrounding the Maastricht Treaty, NPs established their first attempts to engage in 
EU affairs with the establishment of the European Affairs Committees (EAC). These EACs had the 
dual purpose of establishing the principle that NPs should monitor the executive’s EU policy as well 
as creating a mechanism for sifting through the reams of information associated with EU policies.7 
This period was also complemented by the establishment of the Conference of EC Affairs 
Committees of National Parliaments and the European Parliament (COSAC) in 1989. With 
subsequent treaty reforms and the allocation of greater competence to NPs (for the right to 
information, to be involved in treaty amendments as well as to monitor subsidiarity), the NPs have 
entered a third stage where they are ‘viewed as important means of addressing the democratic 
deficit in the union’.8 
This increased involvement of NPs in EU affairs indicates that even though the EU’s impact on the 
legislative branch is indirect, that impact is pervasive enough for NPs to have reacted in a very 
similar manner. In fact, NPs have reacted by either focusing on ex ante (seeking to influence the 
government’s mandate) or ex post (seeking to hold the executive to account for outcomes) 
parliamentary procedures. In terms of the latter, this is often differentiated into political and 
monitoring scrutiny, with the latter taken to be action to ensure that adequate information is 
provided to monitor government while the former is taken to be scrutiny to ensure that the 
executive has exercised its power in a way that parliament (and the electorate) deem acceptable.9    
                                                          
4
 O’Brennan, J. and Raunio, T. (2007), National Parliaments Within the Enlarged European Union: From 'victims' 
of Integration to Competitive Actors?, UK: Routledge. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 This is generally referred to, in European Studies, as the period of the permissive consensus. 
7
 Ladrech, p. 77. 
8
 Norton, P. (ed.) (1996 ), National Parliaments and the European Union, UK: Routledge, p. 182. 
9
 Auel, K. (2007), ‘Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary 
Scrutiny in EU Affairs’, European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 499-500. 
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As noted above, while NPs have endeavoured to engage in EU affairs, the outcome has not always 
been effective involvement, with a central factor explaining outcomes being the institutionalised 
context of parliament, namely its traditional role in domestic politics.10 In this way, the literature 
tends to differentiate parliamentary involvement in EU affairs into four broad categories with NPs 
often falling into more than one category:11  
1) The Policy Shapers where the principal activity is issuing resolutions or mandates on 
government negotiation positions though this may not translate into influence.  
2) Debating Arenas where the focus is upon mobilising the plenary through debates though 
this does not mean that the EACs’ work is less important (Malta fits in this category).  
3) Commission watchdogs where a principal dynamic is dialogue with the European 
Commission. 
4) Scrutiny Laggards where the level of overall activity is so low that there is little attempt to 
influence government or European Commission positions. 
This categorisation of the involvement of NPs in EU affairs reflects the structures they have 
established to oversee scrutiny, the types of scrutiny they engage in as well as the core dynamic 
which underscores how the political parties within a parliament interface with one another. In 
relation to political parties, it became clear that while EACs often perform the same functions across 
member states, their level of influence fluctuates heavily, which reflects the relationship between 
parties within the parliament. Auel and Benz give particular importance to the interaction between 
the majority and opposition parties and the dynamic between the national executive and the 
majority parties in Parliament.12 In this way, majority parties have little interest in trying to control 
the executive’s EU priorities because to do so hampers the executive’s flexibility to negotiate in 
Brussels, undermining its ability to deliver, thus hurting the majority party’s (or parties’) ability to be 
re-elected. Hence, in this case there is little incentive to try and control the government’s mandate 
with NPs finding it easier to invest in ensuring  that government has followed procedures (in 
establishing its EU priorities) as well as holding government to account for what it actually delivers, 
something opposition parties will pursue with vigour.  
This disincentive to engage in EU affairs is then complicated by the information asymmetry between 
the executive and parliament with the former often controlling the flow of information.13 
Parliaments therefore find it difficult to process the vast amounts of EU-related information, and 
majority parties have little incentive to restrict their government’s mandate while the general public 
is often not engaged in EU affairs, meaning that there is little benefit for politicians to prioritise 
scrutiny of EU matters. While this paints an inauspicious picture, political systems based on 
consensus politics, as in Scandinavia, often do play an important role in EU affairs while 
parliamentarians appear to also be forging new skills to better position themselves in EU affairs, 
                                                          
10
Auel, K. and Rittberger, B. (2006), ‘Fluctuant nec merguntur: the European Parliament, National Parliaments, 
and European Integration’ in J. Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy-Making, UK: Routledge.  
11
 Auel, K. and Hoing, O. (2014), ‘Scrutiny in Challenging Times – National Parliaments in the Eurozone Crisis’, 
European Policy Analysis, January Issue 2014, p. 7. 
12
 Auel, K. and Benz, A. (2005), ‘The Politics of Adaptation: the Europeanisation of National Parliamentary 
Systems’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 11:3-4. 
13
 Moravcsik, A (1994), ‘Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International 
Cooperation’, CES Working Paper, no. 52, 1994. 
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such as forging direct links with EU institutions.14 However, such consensus-based politics is not a 
hallmark of the Westminster system where a clear distinction is made between governing parties 
and the opposition and where politics can be highly partisan and often polarised. Therefore, when 
looking at Westminster, after which the Maltese Parliament is fashioned, the British parliament is 
seen as having weak policy influence over EU affairs with its principal role being that of 
communicating with and ensuring adequate information for the relevant committees to remain 
informed of EU business.15 Ultimately, the majority party’s strong control over parliamentary 
business means that the plenary is not often used to discuss EU matters while the European Affairs 
Committee is inadequate for this job. With this in mind and conscious that the Maltese Parliament is 
fashioned upon the Westminster model, we turn our analysis to ten years of EU membership and 
their impact on the Maltese Parliament.  
The Maltese Parliament 
The Maltese Parliament traces its origins back to the 1921 constitution which established a diarchy 
over the islands with a colonial government overseeing reserved matters (primarily defence and 
external relations) while a Maltese government controlled internal affairs. The latter comprised a 
bicameral legislative with a lower house which was directly elected and a senate representing vested 
interests while the franchise was exclusively male. In addition to the establishment of a Maltese 
government, 1921 saw the introduction of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system which allows 
voters to select individual candidates as opposed to parties and often leads to the creation of 
multiparty systems. In the case of Malta, while STV has been used for over 90 years, there have been 
only two parties elected to Parliament since 1966, making Malta a heavily polarised, often parochial 
two-party system with the Social Democrats to the left and the Christian Democrats to the right. 
These two parties have alternated in power for the last five decades, always enjoying an absolute 
majority within the House when in power.16  
Under the Constitution, the Maltese Parliament comprises the President and the House of 
Representatives.17 The Presidency is a symbolic office and there is little evidence of the head of state 
wading into domestic politics, though former presidents have been known to voice their opinion 
during key debates, as with the divorce referendum in 2011. However, the President is chosen by 
Parliament and is often from the ruling party with the result that there is little incentive in 
politicising the office. The House of Representatives is a single chamber legislative comprising 65 
members but with provisions in the electoral law which allow parties to be compensated should the 
number of seats won not tally with the percentage of first preference votes won by the party in the 
general election. Thus, the current legislative comprises 69 seats with 39 being held by the Social 
Democrats, the Labour Party (PL), and 30 by the opposition Christian Democrats, the Nationalist 
Party (PN).    
As noted, the ‘Maltese Parliament is an institution that operates under a set of rules which have 
been modelled on the British House of Commons’ general rules of procedure, but which have been 
                                                          
14
 Auel and Benz (2005), pp. 386-387. 
15
 Ibid., p. 380. 
16
 The only exception to this rule was in 2012 when a member of the Nationalist Party resigned from the party 
but not the House, leaving the Nationalist government dependent on the Speakers casting vote. 
17
 Art. 51, Constitution of Malta. 
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tailored to suit the needs of a much smaller Parliament’ and the House of Representatives itself 
notes that when not provided for by the Standing Orders of the Maltese Parliament, the latter can 
‘still access and benefit from precedents, customs and usages adopted by the House of Commons’.18 
To this end and reflective of developments seen in Westminster, one of the principal innovations 
introduced in the last two decades was the establishment of Standing Committees in 1995. While 
this enabled the Parliament to relieve and facilitate the work of the plenary, the reality remains that 
certain distinct features of the Maltese Parliament condition its ability to involve itself in EU affairs. 
This includes the fact that Parliament is heavily understaffed with no independent budget and 
subject to the recruitment logistics of the public service. There are less than 40 members of staff and 
only 2 research analysts working with Parliament, creating a staffing ratio of 2 MPs for each member 
of staff when the European average is 1 MP to every three to four members of staff. Moreover, the 
House is a part-time parliament that meets three times a week from six to nine in the evening. This 
means that all committee meetings and plenary sessions must take place during the 9 hours 
available each evening because all non-cabinet MPs retain their day jobs with the result that there is 
little incentive to cultivate a level of expertise often necessitated by Standing Committees. However, 
beyond the staff limitations and part-time nature of an MP’s job, a key issue remains the two-party 
system which impacts the executive-majority-opposition dynamic discussed earlier. While it is 
common for single-party government under the Westminster political system, the Maltese 
Parliament represents an extreme version of this with each government enjoying an absolute 
majority in Parliament. Additionally, the executive is often a majority of the ‘majority’ as in the case 
of the current government, where we find 23 PL MPs as members of the government (either as 
ministers or parliamentary secretaries) out of 39 PL MPs. Since the executive always has an absolute 
majority over the opposition, there are important consequences for the expectations one must have 
for Parliament’s involvement in EU affairs. 
EU Membership and Parliamentary Involvement in EU Affairs 
Malta joined the European Union in May 2004. On the signing of the Accession Treaty the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs was renamed the Committee for Foreign and European Affairs (SCFEA) 
and given the responsibility to scrutinise: any proposal for legislation; any document published for 
submission to the European Council, Council or European Central Bank; any proposals for a common 
strategy, joint action or common position under CFSP; any proposal for a common position, 
framework, decision or convention under Justice and Home Affairs; as well as any document 
published by an EU institution.19 However, ‘With regard to EU Affairs, Parliament is primarily 
engaged in the scrutiny of government actions in these matters, rather than EU Institutions directly. 
The Foreign and European Affairs Committee, on behalf of Parliament, examines EU proposals based 
on explanatory memoranda submitted by government’.20 The government’s Explanatory 
Memoranda, which outline the government’s negotiating position in terms of the pipeline acquis 
being issued by the Commission, is then either cleared or can be sent back to the originating ministry 
for further clarifications. The SCFEA is composed of 9 members with the two parties having an equal 
                                                          
18
 Parliament of Malta, historical Background, at http://www.parlament.mt/historicalbackground?l=1 
(accessed 25 June 2014). 
19
 The Parliament of Malta (2014a), Standing Orders 120F. 
20
 COSAC (2013b), Twentieth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices 
Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, Belgium: COSAC Secretariat, p. 280. 
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number of members while the chairman is from the ruling party. The Foreign Minister is an ex officio 
member while MEPs are non-voting members (though no MEPs have attended the committee in 
recent years).21  
Much of the work of the committee is undertaken in four Working Groups, with the most important 
of these being WG1 which filters the Explanatory Memoranda and also decides whether issues need 
to be referred to other Working Groups or Standing Committees.22 A reserve is placed on 
Explanatory Memoranda which are being processed by the House but which the government may 
have begun to negotiate upon within the EU institutions.23 As with Westminster, the Maltese 
scrutiny system is a document-based one with the focus being upon examining EU legislative 
proposals while neither seeking to mandate the government nor to scrutinise proceedings within the 
EU institutions. It has become customary for the Foreign Minister to brief the SCFEA before and after 
meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council while the Prime Minister briefs the plenary after European 
Council meetings but there is no procedural norm for other Ministers to brief the SCFAE before or 
after Council meetings.  
As the principal source of EU-related business within Parliament, one must question the efficacy of 
this system in light of the previous discussion of the limitations faced by NPs in involving themselves 
in EU affairs. It is clear that the SCFEA suffers from several limitations. First, it is hampered by 
resource limitations; the committee has two research analysts but these individuals must assist in 
the work of other committees and have also become increasingly pre-occupied with the Early 
Warning Mechanism, to be discussed shortly.24 The politicians within the committee also lack 
adequate resources or incentives to invest in developing any expertise in European affairs due to 
their other commitments within Parliament (most MPs sit on multiple committees), their full-time 
jobs and the lack of public engagement with the work of the committee. In addition, the committee 
is also hampered by the fact that its ‘working day’ is brief; the SCFEA plenary meets on average for 
20 minutes (with live streaming online) while Working Group WG1, where much of the committee’s 
work is undertaken, meets in camera but cannot overstretch the 3 hour ‘working day’ of Parliament. 
Looking at Table 1, WG1 met four times in 2012, giving a total of 12 hours for the whole year to 
discuss all Explanatory Memoranda as well as the Early Warning Mechanism. While the WG 
prioritises issues, and earlier studies have indicated that 75% of all Commission proposals cover 
areas of no or limited interest to Malta, it still has to filter all Explanatory Memoranda, indicating 
that only a rudimentary appraisal of these Memoranda can be achieved.25 It has also been noted 
that the government often begins substantive negotiations within the Council while the NP is still 
scrutinising its Explanatory Memoranda, indicating that parliament’s role is not substantive. This is 
                                                          
21
 Parliament of Malta (2014b), mill-Parlament: Periodical issued by the Office of the Speaker. No. 4, March 
2014, Malta: Parliament of Malta, p. 10. 
22
 In 2013 the Maltese Parliament established a new standing committee on Economic and Financial Affairs 
which ‘on its own initiative, consider from an economic and financial perspective, any decision, 
recommendation or report published locally, by the European Institutions or by international organisations, 
that could have an impact on the Maltese economy’ (Standing Order 120I). 
23
 A reserve under the Westminster system is a commitment by the government not to commit to any final 
decision within the Council of the EU before Parliament has scrutinised the government’s position. 
24
 Interview with Parliament Staff (16 May 2014). 
25
 Harwood, M. (2012), ‘Malta's Europeanization Experience: How smallness enables a state to minimise the 
monitoring of its implementation of EU policy by third parties’, Journal of Public Administration and Policy 
Research, vol. 4, no. 6, pp. 130-139. 
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to be expected in a system where there is little incentive for the majority party to try and interfere in 
the government’s EU negotiating position when the majority party falls under the explicit control of 
the executive.  
Table 1 – Activities of the SCFEA 
Year No. of 
SCFEA 
Plenary 
meetings 
No. of 
WG1 
meetings 
No. of 
Documents 
considered 
No. of 
Documents 
Cleared by 
WG1 
No. of 
Documents 
Referred 
back to 
Ministries 
No. of 
New EU 
Legislative 
Proposals 
considered 
by the 
Irish 
Parliament 
No. of 
Documents 
received 
under the 
Barroso 
Initiative 
2008 9 5 265     
2009 17 8 456 410 39 39126 1146 
2010 18 8 361 338 21 38227 851 
2011 13 6 256 236 13 42028 1206 
2012 19 4 184 180 4 53729 878 
Source: Parliament of Malta, Annual Report, 2009 – 2013 
The outcome, where parliament’s scrutiny becomes more of a formality than an opportunity for 
added value, also reflects the simple fact that the government’s system for coordinating EU affairs is 
a highly centralised and effective one. This highly centralised system means that all EU-related traffic 
passes through a single body, the EU Secretariat within the Ministry for European Affairs, and it is 
this body which then ensures that ministries establish a single position (the Explanatory 
Memoranda) which is then sent to the cabinet for approval. The centralised nature of this system 
means that even if parliament should wish to establish an independent position on an Explanatory 
Memorandum, it will often have to call on experts who were already involved in establishing 
government’s original position, reflective of the fact that the executive always enjoys an information 
asymmetry over parliament, irrespective of the parliamentary model used by the country.   
With reference to the Westminster system, it is clear that one should not expect a strong mandating 
role from the Maltese parliament and this is what is observed in reality. However, it is clear that by 
relying exclusively on what government sends to parliament (namely the Explanatory Memoranda), 
the SCFEA is effectively not following the wide remit permitted to it under the Standing Orders, 
resulting in the Government controlling the Committee’s agenda and effectively deciding what will 
be discussed. As can be seen from Table 1, the amount of legislative proposals discussed fluctuates 
widely from year to year while the SCFEA has itself indicated repeatedly that it does not deal with 
                                                          
26
 Houses of the Oireachtas (2010), Joint Committee on European Scrutiny: Seventh Annual Report on the 
Operation of the European Union, Ireland: Irish Parliament, p. 6.  
27
 Houses of the Oireachtas (2011), Joint Committee on European Scrutiny: Eighth Annual Report on the 
Operation of the European Union, Ireland: Irish Parliament, p. 8. 
28
 Houses of the Oireachtas (2012), Joint Committee on European Scrutiny: Ninth Annual Report on the 
Operation of the European Union, Ireland: Irish Parliament, pp. 10, 16. 
29
 Houses of the Oireachtas (2013), Joint Committee on European Scrutiny: Tenth Annual Report on the 
Operation of the European Union, Ireland: Irish Parliament, p. 10. 
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the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy).30 
Interviews confirm the fact that the Explanatory Memoranda are being used to establish the 
Committee’s agenda, a narrow remit when compared to that provided for under the Standing 
Orders. More importantly, it means that Parliament is not pro-active in scrutiny but dependent on 
government to set the ball rolling. While the latter denies that any filtering of Explanatory 
Memoranda takes place, the fact that the number of these Memoranda discussed annually 
fluctuates to such a degree while other scrutiny committees abroad tackle a larger volume of 
matters (see Table 1), as well as the fact that the number of documents sent under the Barroso 
Initiative is also significantly higher, would indicate that the parliament is not scrutinising all 
government EU business. This therefore raises questions over Parliament’s ability to hold 
government to account, a key function of the Westminster system.  
In respect of holding government to account, the SCFEA faces several other limitations. Firstly, it 
does not have adequate resources to sift through the mountain of material related to the EU 
institutions, in particular when viewing this responsibility from the Opposition’s perspective. While 
the committee does allow access to documents and also allows the Opposition to do so in order to 
ensure that procedures are followed, it is only able to react to that which is placed before the SCFEA 
by the government. Moreover, while the Foreign Minister sits ex officio on the committee and briefs 
it on developments within external relations, the Minister for Europe does not sit in the committee 
and hence has not addressed the SCFEA during the current legislature. There is no system to 
scrutinise what has been agreed in Brussels or to ensure that other ministers brief the committee 
regularly. In fact, the principal source of accountability is through Parliamentary Questions 
addressed to the plenary but even here, the engagement with EU affairs is limited, see Table 2. 
Table 2: PQs received per ministry during the 12th Legislature31  
Office of the Prime Minister 1000+ 
Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity  1000+ 
Ministry for Energy and Health  1000+ 
Ministry for Transport and Infrastructure  1000+ 
Ministry for Education and Employment  1000+ 
Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security  926 
Ministry for Sustainable Development, the Environment and Climate Change  643 
Ministry for Tourism  576 
Ministry for the Economy, Investment and Small Business Portfolio  467 
Ministry for Gozo  367 
Ministry for Finance  305 
Ministry for Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs and Civil Liberties  291 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs  247 
Ministry for European Affairs and Implementation of the Electoral Manifesto  183 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the two ministries dealing with EU affairs register the smallest amount 
of PQs, with the vast majority of those questions dealing with administrative matters and not the 
substantive issues of EU policy or EU politics. While certain issues can be tackled by the relevant 
                                                          
30
 COSAC (2008), Tenth Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant 
to Parliamentary Scrutiny. Belgium: COSAC Secretariat, p. 27. 
31
 Compiled from http://www.pq.gov.mt/PQWeb.nsf/home?openform (accessed 26 June 2014). 
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ministry, a cursory appraisal of the PQs addressed to other ministries indicates a lack of engagement 
with EU affairs and scrutiny of government activity within the EU institutions. This lack of 
engagement in terms of EU affairs can reflect several realities of the Maltese Parliament, including 
the fact that politics is highly parochial. Politicians, due to STV, often engage in domestic affairs more 
willingly than EU affairs which are often seen as technical and not of direct interest to the general 
public. Therefore the outcome is parliamentary involvement which provides the veneer of 
accountability and which allows the opposition to access EU-related information. It ensures that the 
government sticks to procedures but with very little capacity or incentive to monitor the minutiae of 
government involvement in EU affairs or to hold the government to account for outcomes at an EU 
level, other than in terms of key issues which are normally addressed in the plenary anyway.32 
The Early Warning Mechanism 
While NPs do not always engage effectively in the domestic coordination of EU affairs, the creation 
of the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) under the Lisbon Treaty does provide an opportunity for 
NPs to involve themselves more directly in the EU legislative process. The system allows NPs to issue 
warnings on Commission proposals which are believed to be in breach of the concept of subsidiarity, 
although a third or more NPs must register their disapproval of a proposal for the Commission to 
undertake a review of the proposal. Until summer 2014 there have been only two instances where 
the quota was reached and a review triggered. 
It is not the aim of this paper to go into detail on the EWM as this will be tackled in a separate paper 
in this series. However, it should be noted that the EWM operates under a different procedure from 
the scrutiny mechanism listed above, even if the same structures are involved. Thus, when 
Commission proposals are sent to the Maltese Parliament, these are scrutinised by the Committee’s 
Research Analyst (RA) to check whether the Commission’s proposal complies with the subsidiarity 
principle. The RA is helped in flagging such issues by the IPEX network and the Maltese Delegate to 
the EP. Once an issue has been flagged, the RA establishes a preliminary opinion which is then sent 
to the parliament’s external legal expert, the ‘subsidiarity expert’. If the conclusion reached is that 
the proposal breaches the subsidiarity principle, it is referred to the SCFEA, which then decides 
whether to proceed and register a Reasoned Opinion (RO). Once approved by the House, the 
Speaker then transmits the RO to the House Business Committee before passing it to the EU 
institutions.  
Malta has registered 8 ROs since the establishment of this procedure, two of which included the 
yellow card cases listed above.33 As can be seen from Table 3, Malta has registered ROs in several 
policy fields and the procedure outlined above would indicate that the Parliament is able to act 
efficiently and independently in this area. However, careful scrutiny of the documents submitted to 
the House in relation to the 8 ROs indicates that the picture may be more nuanced than the 
procedure would indicate. While the Parliament does take the initiative in establishing what 
proposals should be tackled, a careful study of each of the government’s Explanatory Memoranda 
(in cases where an RO is then issued) indicate that the government itself registered concerns over 
the proposal’s subsidiarity compliance (in such cases the Memorandum and draft RO for the 
Parliament’s consideration will include a ‘subsidiarity section’). While this does not preclude the 
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 Such as the EU’s reluctance to embrace burden sharing of irregular migrants or the EP vote against Malta’s 
Individual Investors Scheme. 
33
 IPEX (2014). 
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parliament from acting independently, interviews indicate that the RO could be used as a way to 
bolster the government’s negotiating stance in the Council. Other ROs were sent during the summer 
recess when parliament was not in session and so the SCFEA processed these proposals without a 
formal meeting of the committee, suggesting that the government’s position was a determining 
factor.34 The result is that the EWM can be seen as an extension of the majority party’s control of the 
legislative process and, while parliament has valiantly tried to utilise its limited potential in ensuring 
Malta’s involvement in the EWM, the result is a more complex interface between the limited 
resources of parliament and the government’s priorities. 
Table 3: Reasoned Opinions Issued by the Maltese Parliament35 
Commission Proposal Adoption 
Date 
Number of NPs registering a RO  
COM/2013/0627 
Proposal laying down measures 
concerning the European single market 
for electronic communications and to 
achieve a Connected Continent 
11/09/13 Austria 
Ireland 
Malta 
Sweden 
COM/2013/0534 
Proposal for the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor's Office 
17/07/13 Cyprus            Czech Republic 
France             Hungary 
Ireland            Malta 
Romania         Slovenia 
Sweden          The Netherlands 
The United Kingdom 
COM/2013/0409 
Proposal amending Regulation (EC) No 
216/2008 in the field of aerodromes, air 
traffic management and air navigation 
services 
11/06/13 Malta 
COM/2013/0410 
Proposal on the implementation of the 
Single European Sky (recast) 
11/06/13 Malta 
COM (2013) 280 
Communication empowering Local 
Authorities in partner countries  
for enhanced governance and more 
effective development outcomes  
15/05/13 Malta 
COM/2012/0130 
Proposal on the exercise of the right to 
take collective action within the context 
of the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services 
21/03/12 Belgium                 Denmark 
Finland                  France 
Latvia                     Luxembourg 
Malta                     Poland 
Portugal                 Sweden 
The Netherlands The United Kingdom 
COM/2011/0594 
Council Directive on a Common System 
28/09/11 Cyprus 
Malta 
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of Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) Sweden 
COM (2011) 121 
Proposal for a  Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base  
16/03/11 Bulgaria                  Ireland 
Malta                      Poland 
Romania                Slovakia 
Sweden                  The United Kingdom 
Observations of Ten Years of EU Membership 
As noted in the introduction, the EU’s impact on NP is often indirect, leaving the traditional roles of 
representation, deliberation, legislation and authorisation of expenditure largely unaffected. The 
shift of policy competences to the EU nonetheless means that NPs lose out in terms of being denied 
involvement in areas which traditionally came under their exclusive control. However, there is little 
doubt that a major impact has occurred in terms of the traditional role of scrutinising the executive, 
a cornerstone of maintaining accountability and legitimacy within democracies; with government 
unable to control outcomes in Brussels and often negotiating behind closed doors, NPs become 
disadvantaged in terms of the executive-legislative dynamic while an information asymmetry merely 
shifts the balance further in favour of the executive. 
The Maltese Parliament has tried to maintain a role in EU affairs, scrutinising a mountain of EU 
proposals which even large parliaments struggle to cope with. However, parliament’s involvement 
reflects many of the trends seen with Westminster; the party-dynamic, the part-time nature of the 
job, and the information asymmetry mean that the added value of parliamentary scrutiny is minimal 
and appears geared towards legitimising the process as opposed to influencing it. There is no 
systematic attempt to bring ministers to account but rather a general disengagement from European 
affairs with MPs not viewing the SCFAE as significant. However, it can be argued that this outcome 
does not represent any major shift in the executive-legislative dynamic because, as explained earlier, 
this relationship was always tipped in the executive’s favour because of Malta’s two-party system 
and strong executive control over the ruling party. 
On a more positive note, the scrutiny of EU affairs allows for the opposition to ensure that the 
government follows procedures, that it provides information and that it even engages in defending 
major decisions by debating issues in the plenary. To expect it to deliver anything more, however, 
would go counter to the outcomes seen in Westminster and the realities of a two-party parliament. 
That being said, that the SCFEA does not scrutinise CFSP is of concern, as is the continued absence of 
the Minister for European Affairs from the Committee’s work. Where one can argue that the EU 
empowers NPs, namely through the Early Warning Mechanism, we find that even this is being used 
as an extension of the executive’s EU priorities. While innovations (such as the appointment of an EP 
Delegate in 2013) may provide room for optimism, Parliament’s involvement in EU affairs appears 
primarily geared towards providing a veneer of legitimacy to the political process. Furthermore, 
considering the high legitimacy rate the Maltese political system enjoys (with turnout above 90% for 
general elections), that veneer at least appears to be adequate, with the result that one should not 
expect any significant changes in how the Maltese Parliament involves itself in EU affairs in the near 
future. 
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Interviews 
A series of semi-structured interviews were undertaken with present and former members of the 
House. 
Interview with three members (2 LP and 1 PN) of the SCFEA in May 2014, four former members of 
the Committee (2 LP and 2 PN) and two former Chairpersons.   
Interview with the Clerk of the House, the Clerk to the SCFEA and the two Research Analysts in May 
2014. 
 
